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What we’ve got here is a failure to communicate
“Cool Hand Luke,” 1967
SHARED CHALLENGES
Researchers in evolutionary psychology face 
the same grand challenges as researchers 
who eschew the evolutionary approach in 
their own ﬁ  elds of study. Why, and when, do 
people behave altruistically? How do peo-
ple make decisions, economic or otherwise, 
and what role do emotions play in decision-
making? How do people choose their mates? 
How do people acquire information, from 
basic physical knowledge about objects and 
forces to important local knowledge about 
particular people and artifacts? How do 
these processes differ from – or resemble – 
learning processes among non-humans? 
How do the answers to all of these questions 
depend on properties of the individual, such 
as sex, life history phase, genetic endow-
ment, developmental history, and context? 
And what are the physiological and neuro-
physiological substrates of the mechanisms 
that underlie all of these processes?
Evolutionary psychologists share these 
challenges with researchers from other dis-
ciplines because the ﬁ  eld is not, of course, 
distinguished from others in terms of the 
domain of inquiry. Evolutionary psychol-
ogists study economic decision making 
(like economists), interpersonal and group 
dynamics (like social psychologists), cul-
tural processes (like anthropologists), and 
endocrine effects (like physiologists).
The questions evolutionary psycholo-
gists ask are not only our questions, and 
the methodological hurdles we must over-
come are faced by our colleagues with non-
  evolutionary approaches because we share 
the same toolkit, from ethnography to 
behavioral lab studies to neuroimaging.
What, then, are the challenges uniquely 
faced by evolutionary psychology?
UNIQUE CHALLENGES
I would argue that perhaps the ﬁ  eld’s greatest 
challenge lies less is coaxing nature to give 
up her secrets, and more in communicating 
the insights from evolutionary psychology 
to those outside the ﬁ  eld.
Taking an evolutionary approach has 
elicited hostility from audiences since the 
ﬁ  eld’s inception. The story has frequently 
been told of the pitcher of water dumped 
on E.O. Wilson’s head at a meeting for the 
American Association for the Advancement 
of Science in 1978 (Segerstråle, 2000). 
This incident can be seen in retrospect 
as a harbinger of things to come. While 
the water pitcher has been replaced by the 
written word, the level of discourse has not 
always improved. In addition to the politi-
cal attacks on the ﬁ  eld, whether from the 
left or the right (Segerstråle, 2000; Pinker, 
2002), the scientiﬁ  c attacks are so strong 
that they include the charge that evolu-
tionary psychology isn’t even a   science 
(Tattersall, 2001).
Indeed, antipathy for the view that doing 
psychology can be improved with the idea 
of evolved function has spawned an array of 
articles and books with more or less provoc-
ative titles, including allusions to the “Sins 
of Evolutionary Psychology” (Panksepp 
and Panksepp, 2000), a collection of 
Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology 
(Rose and Rose, 2000), Richardson’s (2007) 
Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted 
Psychology, and so on.
Antagonism to the ﬁ  eld takes the form of 
a deep skepticism about work that derives 
from its principles. Kenrick et  al. (2005) 
report an anecdote in which a textbook 
author found that reviewers insisted he 
present criticisms of evolutionary research, 
but not of non-evolutionary research backed 
by less evidence. Conway and Schaller 
(2002) made similar observations, suggest-
ing that it is in the context of evolutionary 
ideas that have consistently been subjected 
to and resisted falsiﬁ  cation “that charges of 
nonfalsiﬁ  ability and other declarations of 
disbelief are most often aired” (p. 154).
Indeed, the skepticism faced by evolu-
tionary psychological hypotheses is stun-
ning set against the credulousness with 
which other ideas are greeted. Baumeister 
and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007) 
have been advancing an Eighteenth century, 
pre-enlightenment notion that there is 
such a thing as “mental energy;” psychol-
ogy’s own phlogiston (c.f., Van den Berg, 
1986). This idea is absurd in the context 
of the computational theory of mind, but 
its absurdity does not seem to have slowed 
the pace of publication. From this, it can 
be inferred that ideas in psychology, even if 
they are fundamentally incompatible with 
known facts, don’t arouse such skepticism as 
long as the idea don’t derive from a systematic 
analysis of evolved function.
Daly and Wilson (2007) suggest that 
critics of the ﬁ  eld “are not just skeptical, 
they are angry” (p. 396), and that the skepti-
cism of their research agenda “appears to be 
motivated by something other than a hum-
ble search for the truth” (p. 390). Critics’ 
anger translates into practices that ought 
to evoke scientiﬁ  c outrage. To take just one 
of many possible examples, Thornhill and 
Palmer (2000) wrote that “whether rape is 
an adaption or byproduct cannot yet be 
deﬁ  nitively answered” (p. 84), but their 
position has been consistently portrayed 
as the opposite, as Lloyd’s (2001) claim that 
they “begin by assuming that rape is a single 
trait, and that this trait is an adaptation” (p. 
1542, emphasis original). A decade on, edi-
tors continue to allow authors to perpetuate 
this misrepresentation: Leiter and Weisberg 
(2010, p. 72) recently did so, ironically 
enough in the context of taking another 
author to task for misrepresentation1.
THE CHALLENGE OF THE CHALLENGES
Debate and discussion are, of course, all 
to the good. Conﬂ  ict helps distill truth, 
as champions make their cases for their 
favored proposition, allowing their views 
to be judged by observers.
1This paper gave me an unusual opportunity to inte-
ract personally and directly with critics because one of 
the authors (DW) is at my institution, the University 
of Pennsylvania, and because both authors presented 
the paper at a colloquium series at Penn’s Law School. 
In February of 2007, well before publication, I pointed 
out various errors in the manuscript, including this 
misrepresentation. The authors chose not to make 
corrections.Frontiers in Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology    March 2010  | Volume 1  |  Article 3  |  2
Kurzban  Grand challenges of evolutionary psychology
in the non-human animal literature (Alcock, 
2001); however, this productive framing of 
discussions can only occur after the relevant 
scholars have fully understood the logic of 
adaptationism and its role in hypothesis 
construction and testing (Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1997).
Secondly, critics routinely and inces-
santly – and incorrectly – assert and insist 
that evolutionary psychology is genetic 
determinist, from Gould (1983), to the 
present day (Quartz and Sejnowski, 2002; 
Lickliter and Honeycutt, 2003; Smith and 
Thelen, 2003). This is emphatically not 
the position of evolutionary psychology, 
as has been made clear any number of 
times (Symons, 1992, p. 140; Tooby and 
Cosmides, 1992; Dennett, 1995, p. 338; 
Pinker, 1997, p. 33).
This short piece is not the place to won-
der why the central animating idea of the 
ﬁ  eld – that the components of the mind 
have functions – is taken to mean that 
development occurs without any inﬂ  u-
ence of the environment. Alcock (2001) 
remarked that “the myth of the determinist 
sociobiologist has been carried forward by 
some opponents who avoid acknowledging 
even in passing the long history of rebuttal 
to this caricature. Why? Because the genetic 
determinist is too convenient a strawman 
to be discarded” (p. 44).
A singular challenge is to make progress 
despite the fact that critics do not appear to 
have any interest in discarding this conven-
ient strawman.
MOVING FORWARD
The key challenge evolutionary psycholo-
gists face is how to interact with the sci-
entiﬁ  c community in a way that does not 
elicit the usual errors described above. This 
is not, of course, to say that evolutionary 
psychologists are always right or that any 
given functional hypothesis will turn out 
to be correct. Evolutionary psychologists, 
like other social scientists – or any scien-
tists for that matter – are obviously going 
to be wrong with great frequency. Favored 
hypotheses will turn out to be incorrect, 
errors in reasoning will become clear, and 
lines of research will have to be reevaluated 
and abandoned.
As things currently stand, however, the 
typical process of correction is retarded 
because interlocutors with evolutionary 
psychology ignore the dialectic of science. 
Instead of challenging ideas and hypotheses, 
critics challenge assumptions and commit-
ments no one holds.
This suggests that the real challenge 
for evolutionary psychology is to get oth-
ers to challenge them on scientiﬁ  c grounds. 
People who disagree with evolutionary 
psychologists are welcome; competition 
and considered debate will only make the 
ﬁ  eld better.
Having said that, and in stark contrast, 
challenging the just-so story-telling ghouls 
and genetic determinist ghosts so many hal-
lucinate helps no one.
As long as disagreements are honest, 
respectful, and about genuine points of 
conﬂ  ict, there really is only one challenge 
that matters: explaining human behavior.
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